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This paper criticizes four typical explanations of settlement of internal conflicts, showing 
that they fail to give an adequate explanation of the 1998 settlement in Northern Ireland. 
Instead of inductively searching for recurrent proximate factors or proceeding deductively by 
applying general theoretical models to settlement processes, it suggests that it may be more 
fruitful to search for underlying path dependent processes which regulate how the factors 
highlighted in the other approaches function. 
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Explaining settlement in Northern Ireland: power, perception and path dependence  
 
Internal communal conflicts vary so widely in their form that valid generalisations are not 
easily found (Brown, 1996; David, 1997;). Settlements are even more difficult to explain, for 
they vary not simply in the type of conflict, which they settle, but also in their status and 
stability (Darby and MacGinty, 2003, pp. 1-6). Most contemporary scholarship either 
searches inductively for recurrent proximate factors (or clusters of such factors) which 
explain settlement in a particular range of cases ( Brown, 1996; Stedman, 2003; King et al, 
2005), or proceeds deductively by applying general theoretical models drawn from other 
fields of study to settlement processes (David, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998). We argue 
that it may be more fruitful to search for underlying path dependent processes, which 
regulate how the specific factors highlighted in other approaches function. As we show 
below, this is not a rejection of comparison or generalisation but a shift in its focus.  
 
We begin with four competing explanations of settlement, which highlight, respectively; 
relations of power, cognitive framing, social networks and institutional opportunities.
 1  
Using the test case of Northern Ireland, where a protracted conflict was brought to an agreed 
(if unstable) settlement in 1998, we show that none is sufficient to explain settlement in this 
case. Each, however, reveals factors that are relevant to the settlement process. We show that 
these factors are closely interlinked and that the effects of each vary with their context and 
interlinkages.  This is precisely the type of phenomenon where process, temporality, pattern 
and sequence are decisive (Pierson, 2004). Rather than search for factors that explain 
settlement in general, we draw on approaches which build temporality into explanation, 
identify sequences of social mechanisms and path-dependent ‘lock-in’ of patterns, and point 
to the modes by which they may be interrupted (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). This type 
of approach is increasingly important in discussions of ethnic conflict.
2 Explanation of 
settlement then becomes a matter of identifying the sorts of processes and interventions                                           Geary WP/3/2006    4 
which impact on and interrupt these sequences and patterns, making settlement possible at 
particular critical junctures; the stability of settlement would depend on the extent to which 
conflict-generating patterns are interrupted, countered or reconfigured. Using the Northern 
Ireland case, this paper suggests that it is indeed possible to identify long-term processes, 
which interrupt patterns of conflict. The case-study highlights the impact of long-term state 
trajectories on patterns of conflict, their interrelation with actors’ categorisations, and the 
impact of wider geo-political processes in provoking trajectory change and in legitimating it 
for the actors.  
 
Competing explanations of settlement processes  
 
Theoretical explanations of settlement processes tend to prioritize one of the following four 
factors: power relations, cultural distinctions and cognitive frames, social networks (and 
their role in forming community boundaries) and institutional opportunities.  
 
A focus on changing power relations has typified rational choice and neo-realist models of 
ethnic conflict and settlement processes (David, 1997; Lake and Rothchild, 1998).  These 
approaches typically take as given the self-definition of the actors and their categorisation of 
their aims, and focus on their resources and strategies. Power is the key resource, and if 
power instability gives incentives for conflict, power stalemate – where actors can prevent 
each other from attaining their ends – gives incentive for settlement; settlement in turn is 
unstable without a credible guarantee that the weakening of one party’s resources by 
compromise (disarmament etc) will not be exploited by the other (Zartman, 1989; Lake and 
Rothchild, 1998; Walter, 2001). The clarity and relevance of these arguments in highlighting 
factors, which foster, or subvert, the quest for settlement are clear.  But they provide less 
than a complete explanation of settlement. They assume actors’ awareness of power 
stalemates, recognition of long-term objectives, belief in external guarantors, thus putting                                           Geary WP/3/2006    5 
categorizations and perceptions back at the heart of analysis (Zartman, 2003).  Moreover, 
distinctions between different orders of time – the potential tension between short-term 
power stalemate and projected long-term shifts in the power balance – which are routinely 
made by actors in their calculations tend, insufficiently, to be brought into this explanation.   
 
A focus on cultural distinctions and cognitive frames is typical of ‘new international 
relations’ theories and cognitivist approaches to ethnic conflict. Some argue that the central 
factor in moving from conflict to settlement is perceptual - a perception of a hurting 
stalemate, a recognition that a win-win situation does, or can, exist - and that this can occur 
at any stage of conflict (Hauss, 2001, p. 218). This approach also informs analyses of micro-
processes of conflict which study how and when actors adopt or reject ethnic labels, link or 
de-link ethnic categories to personal dignity (Kakar, 1996; Brubaker, 2002, Petersen, 2002). 
Yet why such re-categorisations occur when they do is seldom adequately explained. One 
typical explanation appeals to the role of ideologues (or political entrepreneurs) as key 
agents in the process of collective self-definitions (Brubaker, 2002; McAdam et al, 2001). 
Yet this fails to explain why some political entrepreneurs are effective, and others not.  
Another explanation goes beyond the cognitive to point to the importance of experienced 
cooperation with ‘enemies’ in exemplary micro-interactional contexts, for example informal 
diplomacy (Arthur, 1999). Yet this does not itself explain the changes in public attitudes 
necessary to sustain settlement processes. This approach points to mechanisms relevant to 
settlement processes but does not explain why and when they become effective.    
 
A third strategy is to focus on civil society and social networks, showing how 
institutionalised interactions at the local level may provide incentives towards, or safeguards 
against, the escalation of conflict (Varshney, 2001). A complementary tack, which links the 
cognitive with the interactional, is to see how communal boundaries are constituted as 
‘bright’ or ‘blurred’ in everyday interaction, and how this defines the range of choices which                                           Geary WP/3/2006    6 
actors face (Alba, 2005).  These approaches build on theories of ‘bridging’ social capital 
(Putnam, 2003) and theories of how boundaries and distinction are challenged and 
maintained (Lamont, 2000). While this, however, may explain constraints on conflict and 
local variations in its form, it appears at best to form only a part explanation of a move to 
settlement.  
 
A fourth approach focuses on institutions and the opportunities that they may give for 
compromise settlements. In some forms, this constitutes a robust turn away from analysis of 
predisposing causes of settlement to analysis of proximate causes, holding that properly 
designed institutions will themselves act as effective incentives for actors to compromise, 
although most theorists focus also on the conditions which motivate actors to take up these 
incentives (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004). This type of approach may also focus on changing 
long-term institutional opportunities, which form the context for settlement (Keating, 2001). 
This approach sees institutions as the key factors which define power relations, frame policy 
and action and determine the distribution of resources (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.937-40). 
As such, it goes some way towards integrating the previous views. Yet an institutional 
approach tends to neglect the ways in which informal shared understandings, power relations 
and continuing practices of power struggle subvert formal rules and ‘convert’ old institutions 
to new functions, or new institutions to old (Thelen, 2003, pp. 228-230).  
 
These four sets of factors are distinct and irreducible, one to another. For example, the 
institutional opportunities for compromise are not constituted by cognitive shift, nor is this a 
mere by-product of changing power relations or changing social networks. Yet they are also 
interrelated.  Without appropriate institutional opportunities, there is no incentive for 
categorical shift, and plenty of incentive to keep fighting to change the power balance. 
Without change in social networks, perceptual shifts are fleeting and lack social grounding, 
and without perceptual shift, even a stable power balance will be seen as potentially variable                                           Geary WP/3/2006    7 
in the future. An unstable power balance means that any relaxation of cultural or communal 
opposition brings the danger of defeat; yet sometimes it is only the prospect of future, 
potentially still more dangerous, power shifts that gives an incentive to compromise.  
 
The approaches sketched above prioritise one or another factor, taking it as the only variable 
whose change requires close analysis. We have suggested that the factors are interlinked, 
with the effects of each varying with its context and combinations. In this paper we focus on 
one case where a settlement was finally reached after a quarter century of conflict: the case 
of Northern Ireland. This allows us to show not only the failure of any one of these factors to 
explain settlement, but also the variation in their interrelations and effects over time, and to 
propose a different type of explanation of settlement.  
 
 
Northern Ireland: explaining settlement  
 
Agreement was reached between most of the main political parties in Northern Ireland on 
Good Friday, April 10, 1998. What were the conditions, which brought settlement, what 
explains it’s timing, and how stable is it?  How did unionists (at least a majority of them) 
come to agreement with republicans (extreme nationalists who had only recently ended a 
campaign of violence) when six years earlier they had failed to reach agreement with 
moderate nationalists? (see Bloomfield, 1998; 2001)  How did republicans come to accept a 
settlement that, formally at least, appeared to offer fewer constitutional gains than did the 
Sunningdale Agreement, which they had violently rejected a quarter century earlier (Wolff, 
2001)? How could actors who in the recent past had declared conflict, and even violence, to 
be inevitable, a rational and justified response to threat, injury and insult, now begin to 
speak as if it were unthinkable, irrational, a feature of a distant past?  
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The factor most often cited in explanation of the settlement process in Northern Ireland is 
power, and in particular power stalemate. By the mid 1990s there was a mutually recognised 
stalemate between the IRA and the British army. There was also recognition that neither 
unionists nor nationalists could hope immediately to achieve their maximal aims. This gave 
impetus to all parties to negotiate. This is the explanation suggested by English (2003, pp. 
307-13) who takes republicans’ inability to fulfil their goals at either the military or the 
political level as the main factor motivating them to call a ceasefire and to negotiate a 
settlement (see also Schultze, 1997 ). The problem with this explanation is that neither the 
military nor the political stalemate was new. The military stalemate distinguished the 
situation in 1998, when republicans negotiated a settlement, from that in 1973, when they 
had no intention of so doing; but some republicans had perceived a stalemate as early as 
1975, and others in the movement recognised a military stalemate by the mid-1980s 
(English, 2003, p. 307). On the political level, too, stalemate was no more evident in the late 
1990s than in the 1980s. Why then did it become relevant only in the 1990s? We might 
explain this in terms of the actors’ new recognition of emerging long term options, and of the 
changing character of state trajectories and international constraints (Arthur, 2000). But this 
is to move to a different form of explanation of settlement.   
 
Some authors focus on a shift of cognitive frames and cultural distinctions as the key factor 
explaining settlement.  Changing ideologies preceded negotiations: all political parties 
adopted new discourses, which converged around internationally acceptable concepts of 
pluralism, equality and regionalism (Coakley, 2002; Bourke, 2003; English, 2003). Was 
settlement then a product of shifting ideological frames, which allowed actors to recognise 
the possibility of compromise? Eventually, among some actors, there would emerge a 
conceptual shift away from a zero-sum notion of conflict.
3 This shift was relevant to 
settlement, for some key actors it was coterminous with the process of settlement and it has 
strengthened the stability of the settlement. But the direction of causality is not clear: is the                                           Geary WP/3/2006    9 
conceptual shift a cause of negotiations or a product of it, or a product of other practices 
altogether? It was not simply a product of the new political language, which was used as a 
strategic resource to mask conflictual aims as much as an indication of intent (Ruane and 
Todd, 1996, pp. 99-108; 2003). 
 
A third perspective holds that an important factor permitting and sustaining settlement lies in 
the social networks of interaction and civil society organisations where communal 
boundaries are blurred. This explanation suggests that it was the build-up of bridging social 
capital that finally did the trick: it was ‘people power’, a public increasingly able to see 
beyond ethnic divisions towards everyday interests which sometimes converged and seldom 
directly conflicted, which impelled politicians towards settlement (Irwin, 2002). Some 
explain the crises of implementation of the Good Friday Agreement by the failure of 
politicians to prioritise these civil society institutions and allow their voice to predominate 
(Wilson and Wilford, 2003). While there is evidence that cross-community civil society 
organisations can restrain conflict and even provoke identity shift in settlement-sustaining 
directions (Hargie and Dickson, 2003), there are two problems with the proposed 
explanations. First, there was a relatively small increase in institutionalised contexts of 
cross-community interaction in the decade preceding settlement.
4 Second, voting behaviour 
shows that the public, far from pressing the parties to maintain the agreement, have rewarded 
those parties least likely so to do.
5    
 
For some scholars, the key factor permitting settlement was the willingness of the British 
and Irish states to collaborate in proposing a new institutional structure – consociational, 
egalitarian, neo-federalist, with double protection for minorities in either British or Irish 
jurisdictions (McGarry and O’Leary, 2004). While we argue below that the broad shape and 
long-term trajectory of state policy was indeed a crucial factor, the detailed institutional and 
constitutional provisions suggested by the states (and later formalised in the GFA) are                                           Geary WP/3/2006    10 
insufficient to explain settlement for three reasons. First, the detailed institutional provisions 
are insufficiently different from previous initiatives to explain the radical difference in 
outcome. Second, there is no unambiguous institutional configuration which can serve to 
explain settlement, as is seen by the fact that there is no uncontested reading of the 
provisions of the 1998 Agreement, as the parties to it were well aware (Ruane and Todd, 
2001; 2003). Third, neither community (nor their leaders) wholeheartedly accepted the 
shape of this institutional-constitutional deal even after agreement was reached: pro-
Agreement unionists objected to key features of the internal restructuring of Northern 
Ireland, while pro-Agreement republicans (who wanted to develop further this restructuring) 
were careful to accept neither the legitimacy nor the stability of the British role in Northern 
Ireland.
6 The institutional-constitutional provisions on offer were most certainly relevant to 
settlement, but how and why is not self-evident on the basis of the provisions alone.  
 
Nor is it satisfactory simply to add these factors together in explanation. What is important 
for settlement is not simply their co-presence but the manner of their co-presence. In the 
1970s and 1980s they coexisted and yet conflict was reproduced. Extended periods of power 
stalemate (where neither side could attain their ends) were seen as phases in a ‘long war’ and 
led to increased communal mobilisation and intensified cultural opposition. The radical 
change in power relations after 1969 provoked perceptual shift: Protestants moved in mass 
from Irish and Ulster identifications to British (Trew, 1996 ); Catholics and nationalists of all 
political hues rethought what it meant to be Irish. But these shifts were in conflict-generating 
directions. Cross community networks collapsed, only to be built up by state funding which 
itself served as a new source of contention. A series of new political institutions were 
proposed and polarised opinion within, as well as between, the communities. Northern 
Ireland underwent almost constant economic or political restructuring between 1945 and 
1995, but change in any one factor  (core industries, a political stalemate, a ceasefire, the 
1974 power-sharing executive, public shock at another atrocity, peace movements, a process                                           Geary WP/3/2006    11 
of ideological and identity change) did not initiate a benign sequence of changes in other 
factors. More often it intensified conflict. Why? What were the mechanisms by which 
settlement-favouring changes were continually subverted? And what happened in the 1990s 
so that these factors suddenly came to facilitate settlement? To answer these questions 
requires a different form of explanation.  
 
Path dependent patterns and the conditions of settlement in Northern Ireland   
 
How did settlement come about? Why did factors, which had been present for some time 
without leading to settlement, now work together to make settlement appear ever more 
rational and probable? The answer lies in a change in the context in which they operated. We 
conceive of this context in terms of deeply-entrenched, slow-moving longue durée processes 
(Pierson, 2004, pp. 79-83), path dependent patterns and sequences locked in at an early stage 
(Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000), and threshold effects, whereby gradual change builds to a 
point where it finally breaches patterns, producing seemingly sudden and radical effects 
(Lustick, 2001; Pierson, 2004, pp 83-87). This context conditions the way individual 
institutions or mechanisms function, such that changing contextual patterns can ‘convert’ the 
same institutional design to different functions (Thelen, 2003). This approach leads us to 
explain the persistence of the conflict as the ‘lock-in’ of a path-dependent pattern (or 
‘system’ (Ruane and Todd, 1996; 2004).  That pattern was weakened only in the 1990s by 
the intersection of two longue durée processes of change, which allowed the factors above to 
be ‘converted’ to a new significance.   
 
The origins of the pattern lie in the early modern period when English state re-conquest of 
Ireland happened to coincide with the period of religious reformation and empire building.
7 
The resulting stark power disparity and inequality locked in and partially fused a complex 
set of cultural oppositions (religious, ethnic, cultural, colonial) and created a situation where                                           Geary WP/3/2006    12 
rational self-interest (for security or economic livelihood or influence) led individuals to 
band together as Protestants or as Catholics, with the state systematically relying upon the 
former for the maintenance of order and economic development. Interests, emotions and 
values converged: socialization patterns, the ‘moral economy’ of conflict, the repertoires of 
reaction and riot, also locked ‘human capital’ into the pattern, engaging emotions and values, 
mobilizing religious fears, producing a tendency to ‘essentialise’ differences and mobilize 
different groups into totalising communities (Farrell, 2000; Hirst, 2002). .  
 
The conflict-generating pattern long outlasted the colonial period, it was embedded in British 
state institutions in Ireland, it was embodied in the habitus of both communities and it 
became the accepted mode of territorial management whereby the British state relied on the 
local loyal community for administration and security. Stark inequality between Protestant 
and Catholic created a pattern whereby each rise in Catholic power-resources led them to 
challenge the existing institutional order in a quest that stimulated a cycle of communal 
organization, mobilization and antagonism (Wright, 1987, pp. 1-20; Wright, 1996, pp.1-22; 
Hirst, 2002). After 1921, the British state continued to certify Protestant British culture in 
Northern Ireland and to reinforce the inequality of power resources in the region. The 
imbalance of power relations was legitimated in terms of British cultural binaries which 
equally served to increase the cultural resources of Protestants: the Catholic reversal of the 
binaries and attempt to overturn the power relations reinforced the Protestant perception of 
them as ‘treacherous’, ‘backward’ and a threat to Protestants’ values and identity, thus in 
turn justifying Protestant and British defence of the state. Interests, values, and communal 
bonds converged. The pattern created strong incentives for individuals to reproduce the 
pattern, and strong disincentives to step outside it.  
 
These incentives were sufficiently strong to override emerging interests in compromise in 
the 1960s, or in settlement through the 1970s and 1980s. The pattern of conflict meant that                                           Geary WP/3/2006    13 
the broad frame of governance – British rule with its implications for cultural capital and 
security – affected communal interests much more than did any specific form of 
representation (consociational or otherwise): constitutional conflict was therefore 
highlighted at the expense of institutional compromise. Power struggle was endemic; after 
the initial phase of conflict, through most of the 1970s and 1980s, military and political 
stalemate existed but all parties thought in terms of a longer war where victory might 
become possible when conditions changed; in the meantime they struggled over each 
resource and perceived inequality in a battle of wills intended to wear down the other side 
(Wright, 1987). Compromise, whether institutional settlement, ideological change or 
interactional boundary-blurring, was dangerous because it weakened determination and 
communal solidarity, opening a wedge for the enemy’s long-term victory. The traditional 
feedback patterns (driven primarily by situated rational self interest) continued to link power 
relations, communal solidarity and cultural frames of opposition, keeping the conflict at a 
high level of intensity. What changed in the 1990s was precisely this interrelation of 
communal solidarity, power relations and oppositional frames. As soon as rights and 
interests were guaranteed irrespective of state sovereignty, and without the need for 
communal mobilization, compromises could be considered without giving up on long-term 
aims or values. To achieve this, though, required a breach in the entrenched pattern of 
relationships.  
 
This break of the pattern was a product of two interrelated slow-moving processes of change. 
One was the slow rise in Catholic power-resources which had eventually brought 
independence for 26 counties, and which continued within Northern Ireland.
8 The other 
involved a process of repositioning by the British state, which culminated in the 1990s in a 
definitive break with the past. The form of the British conquest of Ireland in the 17
th century 
had locked it into patterns of territorial management very different from those in Great 
Britain and resembling in some respects the divided colonial societies of the empire (Ruane,                                           Geary WP/3/2006    14 
1992; Howe, 2000). The union was an attempt at repositioning as a neutral arbiter between 
the communities:  the establishment of Northern Ireland saw the state again positioning itself 
on the side of one community. The Catholic challenge of the 1960s initiated the first steps of 
a new phase of repositioning, though it was slow, halting and prone to reversal.  
 
The break with the pattern began in the 1980s. The first steps were the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement of 1985 and the subsequent intensification of the reform programme, in 
particular the Fair Employment Act of 1989. The process passed a crucial threshold in the 
1990s when for the first time the British and Irish governments committed themselves to 
undoing the now centuries old pattern.
9  Instead of using its power to underpin unequal 
communal access to resources, power and status, the British state would now use it to undo 
it. There is another longue durée frame in which this can be viewed: as the British state 
shifting ground to complete its long retreat from an imperial role in Ireland. This did not 
require – although it could involve - British state withdrawal from Northern Ireland. For the 
moment it was to be achieved by a reconstitution of Northern Ireland as a region of British-
Irish overlap, an interface periphery between the British and Irish states, open at its borders 
to British and Irish influence and also to input from outside mediators (the US, the EU), with 
egalitarian and bi-national policies and with sovereignty decreasingly important in the daily 
run of affairs. The British state had always been prepared to countenance different 
institutional arrangements for Northern Ireland, consistent with its asymmetric institutional 
structure: it had never been willing to weaken the key constitutional tenets that were central 
to state authority in the United Kingdom (Todd, 2003). The new factor was its willingness to 
do this, expressed in its increasingly close involvement with the Irish government in co-
management of conflict (from 1985), in its affirmation that it was a facilitator of agreement 
on the island, without ' selfish strategic or economic interests'  in Northern Ireland (1991-3), 
and later in its welcoming of US intervention (Owen, 2002). 
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The change in the British trajectory occurred in a wider geo-political context. Its trigger was 
the imperative to reconfigure state institutions to succeed in the new global economy 
(Krieger, 1999) and, more immediately again in the 1990s, to restore the special relationship 
with the US.  Within Britain this entailed a restructuring of the British polity (devolution-all-
around, multi-culturalist reconfigurations of ‘official’ British identity) which also impacted 
directly on the public culture in Northern Ireland and on the interactional patterns deemed 
acceptable in institutional settings: traditional unionist notions of the sovereignty of the 
‘Crown in Parliament’ and the hope of full integration in the United Kingdom were 
becoming politically irrelevant.  
 
There was a corresponding Irish dimension. The Irish government’s post-1950s strategy of 
openness first to economic, later to cultural and political impacts had developed, by the 
1980s, into a distinctive self-conscious project of adapting to the new global environment by 
playing off powerful British, US and European forces against one another to national 
advantage. This led to major socio-economic changes; the ‘Celtic tiger’ economy (O Riain, 
2004) and secularisation weakened the entanglement of religious and cultural differences 
and interests with national categories, encouraging some unionists (most prominently the 
business class) to reconsider their relationship to the Irish state. There was also a direct 
impact on the Irish state’s Northern Ireland strategy: sovereignty was no longer of core 
importance, borders were permeable and Irish unity came to mean ever-greater island-wide 
integration while keeping an openness to Britain in both parts of the island. Through the 
1970s and 1980s, the Irish state poured major diplomatic resources and energy into 
promoting this as the way to settle the Northern Ireland conflict and their rhetoric of 
European regionalism became the language of the peace process in Britain, Europe and the 
US (Fitzgerald, 1991).  
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The new state strategies and the ‘peace process’ itself were justified in terms of emerging 
international norms which no longer held borders sacrosanct (Guelke, 2002). There is debate 
on the direct effects of international influence on party strategies in Northern Ireland.
10 
Indirectly, however, the wider geopolitical context was crucial in legitimating and 
guaranteeing the changes in state strategies for the actors in Northern Ireland: that British 
(and Irish) state repositioning was a rational response to a new international order, and seen 
as such by major actors like the US, showed that the change was set to deepen and broaden 
for the foreseeable future, indeed to be the future. The political actors in Northern Ireland 
intuitively thought in terms of long-term patterns of conflict: these patterns were now visibly 
changing. That also changed the functions and significance of institutions and ideas which 
most of the parties had long rejected: consociationism took on a new appeal.   
 
With the states’ commitment no longer to underwrite communal power, but rather to 
guarantee rights and interests irrespective of power relations, the salience of communal 
power decreased and the cost of continued power struggle was increasingly felt. The interim 
power stalemate thus began to become a compelling reason for changing strategy. By the 
same token, as state sovereignty came to be seen to be less important for rights and interests, 
the attraction of consociational institutions increased, particularly as they were now 
presented in the context of an open-ended constitutional future consistent with opposed 
long-term aims. As communal solidarity began to relax, existing cross-community networks 
could increase in prominence. The process also had a cognitive dimension, with change in 
the beliefs, which in the past had defined what it meant to be a republican or a unionist. 
Classic tenets of republicanism (that the British government was an imperial presence in 
Ireland which could not be negotiated with; that only violence would persuade it to 
withdraw) were now put in the balance, jettisoned or overturned (Ruane, 2004). Unionists 
recognized that to secure the Union they had to accept that it would inevitably be looser,                                           Geary WP/3/2006    17 
with a changed form and cultural substance and a different concept of Britishness, and that 
an Irish dimension was inevitable (Aughey, 1999; Patterson, 2004).  
 
There was, however, ambiguity. These state changes converged with a long-term shift in 
power-relations internal to Northern Ireland whereby Catholics were approaching but had 
not yet attained demographic, economic and political equality. Was the British government 
committed to sustaining an egalitarian communal balance in a bi-national Northern Ireland 
for the long term, or was this part of the longue durée process of imperial disengagement, a 
gradual handing over to the rising indigenous community? This ambiguity has lain at the 
heart of the Good Friday Agreement and the divisions and political cross-currents it has 
generated have been a primary source of the crises that have bedeviled it (Ruane and Todd, 
2001).  It also underlies one line of republican strategic thinking, that the Agreement is an 
opportunity to amass power resources for renewed struggle in the future.  
 
The structure of our argument is as follows. Existing explanations identify four factors that 
there is good theoretical reason to believe should contribute to settlement: power relations 
(in particular power stalemate), cognitive frames (perceptual and ideological shifts), social 
networks (of a cross-community form) and (consociational) institutional opportunities. We 
showed their presence in Northern Ireland from the 1970s without any apparent impact on 
the conflict, although in the 1990s it seems incontrovertible that they played a role in 
settlement. This change in their effects was brought about by slow-moving longue durée 
processes which, intersecting to reach threshold effects, disrupted a path dependent pattern 
of conflict and ‘converted’ the significance of these factors for the actors. Two interlocking 
longue durée processes were particularly important: one was the British state’s re-
positioning from supporter of one community to mediator between two; the other was the 
emergence of near parity between the two communities in Northern Ireland. In the 1990s 
each occasioned and strengthened the other, allowing the actors to recognise a developing                                           Geary WP/3/2006    18 
(and still open-ended) trajectory which unionists, nationalists and republicans each had to be 
part of, if only in order to shape it to their interests. The path-dependent pattern of conflict 
had been driven by the rational self-interest of situated actors. It changed as new state 
strategies and long-term opportunities required the actors to resituate themselves. At that 
stage, rational self-interest began to point to settlement rather than to conflict. The perceived 
shift in the deeper level pattern gave significance to the proximate factors listed above.  The 
ambiguities in that pattern continue to destabilise the settlement.  
 
 
Settlement as the breach of path dependent patterns 
 
We have argued here for a particular strategy for explaining settlement processes. Instead of 
inductively searching for recurrent proximate factors (or even clusters of such factors), or 
proceeding deductively by applying general theoretical models of power, cognition, social 
capital or institutional incentives to settlement processes, we suggest that it may be more 
fruitful to search for underlying path dependent processes which regulate how these factors 
function. This is not a rejection of comparison or generalisation but a shift in its focus. The 
defining characteristic of a path dependent pattern is precisely its uniqueness, stemming 
from the particular contingent events which set a particular combination of elements and 
mechanisms in place (Mahoney, 2000, pp. 507-8).   However the presence of path dependent 
patterns in protracted conflicts is likely to be general, just as are the types of factors involved 
and the types of interventions, which break their patterning. This approach suggests the need 
to reframe the competing explanations with which we began.  Rather than identifying 
sufficient or even necessary conditions of settlement, they are better seen as describing 
social mechanisms, causally relevant to settlement but not necessary or sufficient to produce 
it.
11 The functioning and outcomes of these mechanisms are dependent not just on their 
sequencing and interrelations (see McAdam et al, 2001) but also on their relation to                                           Geary WP/3/2006    19 
underlying path dependent patterns. The following points of comparative relevance follow 
from the discussion above.  
 
First, some conflicts are so locked in, with such a multiplicity of convergent reasons for 
conflict that no single change – however good the institutions or balanced the power 
relations – is enough to bring settlement. Only a change sufficient to breach the path-
dependent pattern will allow these factors to have effect.  Since actors themselves intuitively 
recognise the long-term patterns, expect them to continue, and devise their strategies 
accordingly, change has to be sufficiently radical and long-term to convince them that the 
patterns are broken.  
 
Second, one way that such change can occur is through change in the geopolitical context 
which at once provokes multiple changes in the conflict region and ‘guarantees’ to the actors 
in the region that these changes will not easily be reversed. One might argue that the basic 
difference between the relatively successful Northern Irish settlement and the unsuccessful 
Oslo peace process lies in this wider context (Ben-Porat, 2005 ).  
 
Third, this allows settlements to be seen as products of ‘critical junctures’, disruptions of 
paths or collisions between different paths (Mahoney, 2000; Rueshemeyer, 2003; Thelen, 
2003). In this case, as indicated above, the ‘collision’ was mediated by the Irish state, which 
orchestrated changes and channelled state and international resources into the settlement 
process through its definition of the peace process in terms of European regionalism and the 
need for open borders.  
 
Fourth, radical, long-term changes in state trajectory and opportunity structure facilitate 
settlement in part by provoking radical re-categorisations among the parties to the conflict: 
this allows them to see new long-term opportunities in institutional provisions which before                                           Geary WP/3/2006    20 
they would have rejected as insufficient or as radically unfair. This does not have to involve 
change in goals – amongst both unionists and republicans it was rather change in constitutive 
assumptions. Such change does not mean that previous beliefs were shallow, but rather that 
they were intimately connected to existing patterns of power and opportunity.   
 
Fifth, among the many reasons why peace processes and settlements may break down (see 
Darby and MacGinty, 2003) is that the actors come to believe that their re-categorisations 
were mistaken. Since 1998, increasing numbers of unionists have come to believe that the 
GFA did not secure their position but instead benefited nationalists.
12 The misjudgement 
may also be in another direction. Those republicans who believed that the changes were 
moving with the ‘grain of history’ to nationalist victory may find that instead they have 
become locked in a new path where victory is even farther away than before (McIntyre, 
2001).  One of the difficulties for pro-settlement leaders in contemporary Northern Ireland is 
in judging just how far state trajectories and patterns of conflict have in fact shifted (see 
Ruane, 1999).  
 
The explanation of settlement suggested here builds on the insights of new approaches to 
conflict, focussing on sequences and patterns of factors, lock-in and path-dependence. This 
approach has not, to our knowledge, before been used in analysis of settlements. It is so 
difficult to find adequate explanations of settlement, either in general or – as we have seen 
here – in hard cases, that it is important to open up another approach, particularly when, in 
this case at least, it appears strikingly to succeed where others fail. The fact that it echoes the 
actors’ own interpretations, their sense of a ‘new beginning’, is itself significant. If actors 
themselves believe in the existence of such patterns of conflict, the importance of changing 
state trajectories outlined above will hold irrespective of the specific content and truth of the 
actors’ beliefs. Finally, this form of explanation allows us to identify the difficulties of 
achieving settlement and the problems with incremental approaches to settlement, without                                           Geary WP/3/2006    21 
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